An opportunity to ensure public goods like affordable housing, or a giveaway? Cirrus/LCOR also seek more bulk (worth $320M?), housing subsidies, & tax breaks.
Is there ever been a point where the increasing cost of the platform makes this a unwise place for government subsidies to achieve housing? Like maybe we need to look elsewhere instead for land to build housing with that platform money?
There's always a number, and the issue is political.
The cost of the platform for Hudson Yards Phase 2 was insurmountable, until it wasn't, thanks to a city-agreed tax break.
An argument, I *suspect*, behind subsidies for the Vanderbilt Yard platform is that this would make the "land" viable and competitive with other parcels not burdened by the same infrastructure costs, and the city/Brooklyn needs this particular set of parcels to be completed given their opportune location near transit and to knit a partial project together.
That argument should be ventilated publicly, rather than indirectly ventriloquized by me.
(There's a somewhat similar argument for the more vast subsidies proposed for Sunnyside Yard in Queens, a much larger parcel that has the potential to knit together three neighborhoods.)
The case for platform subsidies, however, should be complicated, I think, in multiple ways. The first requires a look at the developer's finances: their cost to enter, their agreement with partners, their expected returns.
Why socialize the risk and privatize the gain? If the public has a stake, then shouldn't it have a stake in the upside. How could that be achieved?
(It would've been different had the original open bidding for railyard development rights had included a public commitment to the platform, since that presumably even playing field would've generated more than two bids.)
Relatedly, as discussed in the article, how could subsidies be tied to performance guarantees regarding affordable housing, timing, and more?
Given that previous performance guarantees have proven unenforceable, how can future guarantees overcome that hurdle?
The issues discussed above accept and assume the developer's proposed scale as a given. That should be ventilated too.
As I've written, with potentially nearly 5,000 apartments in five towers on the two-block railyard, that's a lot of density. I asked for a comparable project and didn't get an answer.
So there are huge questions about how that would function as a viable community.
This logic, as I'm sure you realize, could lead to an argument that the buildings should be smaller, and thus delivering a lesser amount of revenue and/or affordability.
So, how compensate for that? More subsidies?
Or, perhaps, going back to the financial analysis: why should Greenland USA, which retains some stake in the project, be allowed to evade payment for the missing affordable housing? How much could be extracted from their stake?
Remember, New York State retains significant leverage, not just in negotiating the new project plan, but in approving the proposed transfer of bulk from the unbuilt B1 tower, once slated to loom over the arena, to Site 5, across Flatbush Avenue.
Who does that benefit? First, the developers. They'd be able to monetize something they (or, to be more precise, their successors, but they knew they were buying into it) couldn't monetize.
Even more importantly, as I've written, that benefits the arena operating company, owned mainly by Joe Tsai. Not building, and operating, the B1 tower, helps Tsai avoid significant interference with arena operations and revenues, since the open plaza is crucial to both.
That's a key point of leverage, but only if public officials, led by Gov. Kathy Hochul, choose to use it. It doesn't seem to be a priority.
I'd like to see all this--and the arguments I've perhaps missed--prompt further discussion.
In the broadest terms it does make economic sense to build over the rail yards. Platform cost isn't the issue until the developer is restricted from utilizing the platform fully (though height/FAR limits, subsidized housing requirements, etc.)
Is there ever been a point where the increasing cost of the platform makes this a unwise place for government subsidies to achieve housing? Like maybe we need to look elsewhere instead for land to build housing with that platform money?
There's always a number, and the issue is political.
The cost of the platform for Hudson Yards Phase 2 was insurmountable, until it wasn't, thanks to a city-agreed tax break.
An argument, I *suspect*, behind subsidies for the Vanderbilt Yard platform is that this would make the "land" viable and competitive with other parcels not burdened by the same infrastructure costs, and the city/Brooklyn needs this particular set of parcels to be completed given their opportune location near transit and to knit a partial project together.
That argument should be ventilated publicly, rather than indirectly ventriloquized by me.
(There's a somewhat similar argument for the more vast subsidies proposed for Sunnyside Yard in Queens, a much larger parcel that has the potential to knit together three neighborhoods.)
The case for platform subsidies, however, should be complicated, I think, in multiple ways. The first requires a look at the developer's finances: their cost to enter, their agreement with partners, their expected returns.
Why socialize the risk and privatize the gain? If the public has a stake, then shouldn't it have a stake in the upside. How could that be achieved?
(It would've been different had the original open bidding for railyard development rights had included a public commitment to the platform, since that presumably even playing field would've generated more than two bids.)
Relatedly, as discussed in the article, how could subsidies be tied to performance guarantees regarding affordable housing, timing, and more?
Given that previous performance guarantees have proven unenforceable, how can future guarantees overcome that hurdle?
The issues discussed above accept and assume the developer's proposed scale as a given. That should be ventilated too.
As I've written, with potentially nearly 5,000 apartments in five towers on the two-block railyard, that's a lot of density. I asked for a comparable project and didn't get an answer.
So there are huge questions about how that would function as a viable community.
This logic, as I'm sure you realize, could lead to an argument that the buildings should be smaller, and thus delivering a lesser amount of revenue and/or affordability.
So, how compensate for that? More subsidies?
Or, perhaps, going back to the financial analysis: why should Greenland USA, which retains some stake in the project, be allowed to evade payment for the missing affordable housing? How much could be extracted from their stake?
Remember, New York State retains significant leverage, not just in negotiating the new project plan, but in approving the proposed transfer of bulk from the unbuilt B1 tower, once slated to loom over the arena, to Site 5, across Flatbush Avenue.
Who does that benefit? First, the developers. They'd be able to monetize something they (or, to be more precise, their successors, but they knew they were buying into it) couldn't monetize.
Even more importantly, as I've written, that benefits the arena operating company, owned mainly by Joe Tsai. Not building, and operating, the B1 tower, helps Tsai avoid significant interference with arena operations and revenues, since the open plaza is crucial to both.
That's a key point of leverage, but only if public officials, led by Gov. Kathy Hochul, choose to use it. It doesn't seem to be a priority.
I'd like to see all this--and the arguments I've perhaps missed--prompt further discussion.
In the broadest terms it does make economic sense to build over the rail yards. Platform cost isn't the issue until the developer is restricted from utilizing the platform fully (though height/FAR limits, subsidized housing requirements, etc.)